Under hava, the certification program was restructured under the Election Assistance commission (EAC) and Thomas Wilkey, the individual formerly responsible for this task under nased, was appointed as the eac's Executive director, where he has continued to perform oversight of the testing and certification tasks. The eac generated a new set of Voluntary voting System guidelines, which was approved in December 2005, far too late to have any systems tested and deemed compliant in time for the 2006 hava deadline for replacement of lever and punch card systems. Though there were some slight improvements, these guidelines suffered from most of the same problems as did the fec standard (as noted above and in my comment to the eac ). A proposed revision (including the mit/nist-proposed Orwellian concept of Software Independence - that a voting machine could contain software but somehow be independent of it) was issued for public comment in 2009 as vvsg.1, but portions were harshly criticized ( including earlier by myself. Many of the voting systems that have been certified under the 2005 eac standard were subsequently found to be faulty in actual elections or via independent studies (reports commissioned by state or local governments are posted at px ). The list of certified voting systems can be found at px but these are only the current certifications.
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Those of us (including myself) who had worked hard for this bill were sorely disappointed that the most salient aspects of its implementation were stalled, while initial equipment purchases were allowed to proceed under grandfathered and for obsolete standards. Many municipalities (including in California, florida and elsewhere) purchased voting equipment that subsequently had to be replaced due to non-compliance, system failures, and security and auditability concerns. It has taken years to only partially unwind the many problems caused by the feeding frenzy generated by overzealous voting system vendors seeking the hava funds, fueled by gullible election officials who were intimidated into doling the money out for products that were not yet. Some of this unnecessary waste of funds could have been avoided, had Congress merely extended the hava deadlines, or had the appointments and work proceeded on schedule. But vendors said their voting machines were certified:. Voting systems, beginning in 1990, have been certified under a system originally established by the federal Election Commission (FEC) and a private group, the national Association of State Election Directors (nased). Testing fees are paid, by the vendors, to certain qualified Independent Testing Authorities and examinations are conducted secretly without any results (other than a final passed status) issued publicly. This certification was, at first, based on the fec guidelines adopted by only 37 of the states and criticized by technologists as flawed. . (see my detailed comment The fec proposed Voting Systems Standard Update.) According to their website, even "the fec recognizes that the help Americans sic Vote Act of 2002 will fundamentally alter the long term application of the Standards, including testing." Some problems with the fec. Even when additional state certification inspection has been performed, there may be no guarantee that any particular system has been appropriately configured prior to deployment. Revelations that uncertified software was used in at least two california elections (including the gubernatorial recall) led to the mandate that voter verified paper ballots be added to their fully-electronic voting systems.
to obtain the money, an implementation plan had to be submitted to the Election Assistance commission by january 1, 2004. States were not required to purchase fully computerized voting systems, they could obtain mark-sense (optically scanned) products that use paper, but in order to receive certain of the equipment funds, the plan had to indicate that the state would replace all of its lever and. New York was the only state that decided to retain its lever machines. The Presidentially appointed 4-member hava election Assistance commission, in addition to approving each of the state plans, was also to be responsible for administering a host of other tasks, not the least of which included overseeing essay a 14-member Technical guidelines development Committee and a 110-member. What actually occurred was that the members of the hava commission were appointed nearly a year late and the establishment of hava committees and boards were similarly delayed. Thus, the technical guidelines were not available by the time that state implementation plans were due. This resulted in 9 states requesting hava extensions, and many others contracting to purchase voting systems that could not possibly be hava compliant, since no official hava standards yet existed. A further setback occurred at the beginning of 2004, when the national Institute of Standards and Technologies (nist) announced that it had to curtail all work related to hava (despite their named role in the legislation due to federal budget cuts (funds were later reinstated.
Even so, such formulas require that increasing percentages be audited if anomalies are detected, so you might as well just count all the ballots from the get-go to avoid the further hassle. For a detailed explanation of why these incomplete audits don't work, see my post on the cnet defensive computing blog. Oh, and if someone tells you that if people touch the ballots they'll change the votes, just explain that page feeders could be used with opaque projectors to display the papers without any human handling. Voter Verified Paper Ballots - an Informational Brochure: An explanatory brochure has been prepared in response to the myths and misinformation that are currently being circulated by those who are opposed to independent election auditing. " Facts About Voter Verified Paper Ballots " can be downloaded, printed on double-sided paper, and freely distributed (if in its entirety and unedited). Although dres with vvpbs are an improvement over dres without them, because of numerous issues related to the construction and use of vvpbs (some of which are noted below since 2003 I have recommended against the purchase of these devices. Ballots should be prepared on paper (not computers) and counted from the paper (preferably by humans). The Act that did not help America vote: The 2002 Help America vote Act (hava) legislation authorized.8B in federal spending, with a substantial portion of these funds allocated to us states and territories for the purpose of replacing their punch card and lever voting.
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Heck, we can't even prove that these devices (whether dres or scanners) are adding 112 properly. It's all a trade secret and we're not allowed to check the algorithms. How can we ever hope to verify malayalam that the complicated math needed to generate the irv totals has been programmed and implemented correctly? If you find yourself in a conversation with anyone supporting irv, just ask them to show you on paper how to tally the election and then watch them squirm. Make sure your municipality, county, and state does not fall for irv. For more details on what's wrong with irv, read James Langan's research paper, Instant Runoff Voting: a cure That is likely worse Than the disease.
Danger to democracy 3, perhaps because Americans are considered to be notoriously lazy, our election officials would rather find excuses for not hand-counting all of the ballots in order to verify the results produced by the computers. Of course, the reasons given for not checking the totals at each precinct (before the ballots are removed and some have a chance to mysteriously wander away) are often ones of cost or expedience. As it turns out, a small team of vote counters (perhaps drafted as for jury duty using a simple bin (not binary) method should be able to hand-tabulate all but the most complex ballots in time for the 11 o'clock news (assuming that the polls. (For the computer scientists, it helps to recall that a bin sort is O(n).) The counting could even be live-streamed on Facebook from every precinct, so all can see the results in real-time! Of course there are plenty of wrongheaded mathematics wonks (including even some at lofty places like princeton and mit and even a few Congressfolk, who would like us to believe that a random percentage audit (or partial audit) is all that is necessary to confirm. This is provably untrue.
If enough states (they only need a total of 270 electors) are stupid enough to allow their legislatures to pass the bill and their governors sign it, then we're all hosed, even if your own state doesn't sign. Here's what it really means and why it's on my evoting website - states that have unauditable voting will be incentivised to increase their bogus vote totals for President well beyond what they need to do to win their own state, enough so that they. This is no problem for places like ohio, where observed variations in the number of persons who sign the polling book from the number of ballots recorded on the machines, in over 80 of precincts, is somehow considered "normal" - or in Florida where the. Basically, if npv becomes law, then the. Crooks are in Control for sure.
To find out the status of npv in your state, check m - if it does not say "enacted" yet, then let your State senator, State representative and governor all know right away that this is a horrible idea that should not become law. Your voice on this can make a difference! On April 15, 2011, i contributed an OpEd column to hawai'i reporter explaining why governor Abercrombie should veto the hawai'i house and Senate npv bill. The article is here: Hawai'i's Instant Runoff Voting Legislation - veto needed - please read and use for talking points to oppose the scam of npv. Danger to democracy 2, the same group that has been promoting npv is also hawking Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). Certainly not coincidentally, the key founder of the organization behind both of these absurdities is none other than John "the spoiler" Anderson. Irv is getting a foothold with naieve communities who would like to believe the snake oil salesmen's claims that by making the voting selection process harder (not easier) this somehow further enfranchises beleaguered minority groups and third party candidates. The reason why i'm mentioning irv here is again because of the voting machines.
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National Popular Vote (NPV) legislation has been creeping into state after state. A hotel large push for this backdoor run around the. Constitution has developed following the 2016 Presidential Election. For those of you who don't know friendship what it is, npv, when fully enacted, would mandate that states cast their electoral votes, not how the voters of those states intended, but rather to the winner of the national popular vote. Yup, your electors would be required to cast their Presidential votes to the aggregate us highest vote-getter, regardless of who the winner was in the state itself. I can't imagine how this could even remotely be deemed Constitutional (remember the concept of States' rights?) but it would likely take a team of Harvard-educated lawyers to argue this point before the. Supreme court to stop it, if enacted.
At the present time, it is my strong recommendation that all election officials refrain from procuring any system that does not provide an indisputable, voter the verified paper ballot. Communities have gradually discovered that manually prepared paper balloting systems, augmented with assistive paper ballot-marking devices for use by the disabled and those with literacy and language issues, can typically be procured and maintained for considerably less than half of the price for a direct. Ballot-marking devices do not need to be electronic or computer-based. Opscan-style ballots can (and should) be entirely hand-counted. Paper ballots increase voter confidence by offering the best in terms of reliability, usability and recountability, as well as being highly cost-effective. Since 2003, because of unresolvable problems with the implementation and deployment of the dre/vvpat systems, and the difficulties experienced in using the vvpats in recounts, i have recommended against the purchase of these devices. A detailed explanation of these points, along with my suggestions regarding the selection of appropriate voting equipment, is provided in the full text of this statement, available * here. Table of Contents, electronic voting update, danger to democracy 1.
helpful to look at the guidelines posted here. I would appreciate it greatly if calls can be limited to the hours of 10am - 6pm,. Follow links to full text of papers and articles. Papers not linked may be available on request. As this website is rather long, i've highlighted certain "must read" papers and articles using red asterisks ( * ). For a good overview of the subject, search for these first and read the text at their adjacent links. Statement, i am adamantly opposed to the use of fully electronic or Internet-based systems for use in anonymous balloting and vote tabulation applications. . The reasons for my opposition are manyfold, and are expressed in my writings as well as those of other well-respected computer security experts.
Electronic Voting, rebecca mercuri,. Box 1166 - dept. Philadelphia, pa 19105 notable at notablesoftware dot com 215/327-7105 or 609/ am-6pm. (Please try empire the 609 number first) m, the contents of this webpage and website are copyright by rebecca mercuri. All material is protected by copyright attributed to rebecca mercuri where she is the sole author, or the original sources otherwise. This website has been updated to repair links in the earlier version and also includes commentary related to the 2016. Presidential Election and its aftermath. To report broken links, please notify me via the above contact information (preferably email).
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The materials below are intended as supplementary material to the. Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, sixth Edition. Due to space and printing limitations, they are referenced from but not printed in the actual. Chapter 2: Manuscript Structure and Content. Chapter 3: Writing Clearly and Concisely. Chapter 4: The from mechanics of Style. Chapter 5: Displaying Results, chapter 7: Reference Examples, chapter 8: The publication Process share this page.